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Abstract 
This paper analyzes stealth trading by corporate insiders in US equity markets. Stealth trading 
is the practice to break up trades into sequences of smaller trades. We find that stealth trading 
is pervasive and distinguish two explanations. The first argues that insiders break up trades in 
order to conceal private information about the fundamental value of the stock, whereas the 
second holds that insiders act like discretionary liquidity traders who want to reduce the tem-
porary price impact from trading large stakes. We find some, but inconsistent evidence for 
information-based explanations, but strong and unambiguous evidence for liquidity-based ex-
planations. These conclusions hold across subsamples for transactions before and after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley act and for NASDAQ as well as NYSE stocks. 
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1 Introduction 
Between May 24 and May 26, 2005, Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google, sold shares worth 
$29.3 million of Google stock and split this trade into 1,744 transactions.1 In this paper, we 
investigate such stealth trades by corporate insiders, where stealth trading is the strategy to 
break up trades into sequences of smaller trades (Barclay and Warner, 1993). While the ex-
ample of Eric Schmidt’s trades is extreme, it is common for insiders to break up their trades 
into two to ten transactions. However, some orders, even large ones, are not broken up at all. 
There are two explanations for stealth trading. The first explanation is that traders possess 
private information about the fundamental value of shares and may therefore want to conceal 
their trades in order to hide this information. This hypothesis was put forward by Barclay and 
Warner (1993), who refer to Kyle (1985) as a theoretical basis for their hypothesis.2 The sec-
ond explanation is that traders act as discretionary liquidity traders who do not possess private 
information, but try to optimally use market liquidity by placing their orders in markets and 
during trading hours when liquidity is large and when the price impact of their trades is 
small.3 For both hypotheses it is immaterial to what extent insiders make use of intermediaries 
to break up their orders as long as they exercise control over the decision whether their orders 
are split or not. 
A major difficulty with analyzing these explanations is that transaction databases do not 
track the identity of investors who buy and sell shares. Standard databases can therefore not 
reveal sequences of stealth trades and all evidence on stealth trading is therefore necessarily 
                                                          
1  In all likelihood Schmidt split his trades with the help of an intermediary who offers electronic order process-
ing. An article in Securities Industry News dated September 18, 2006, reports that JP Morgan Chase’s elec-
tronic client solutions unit offers two new liquidity-seeking algorithms that scan NASDAQ and seven trading 
platforms to provide „hidden-liquidity trading.“ A more recent article (Forbes, January 12, 2009) describes 
order splitting of CS First Boston’s „Advanced Execution System,“ for which „the average institutional trade 
is now only 233 shares”. 
2  In Kyle (1985) the insider is a monopolist for long-lived information. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) 
show that his argument may not carry over to a situation where multiple insiders possess the same informa-
tion. They will then compete for the use of this information and trade in a shorter period of time, which in our 
context means that they engage less in stealth trading. Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001) adapt Kyle’s 
model to a context where insiders have to disclose their trades, but in their setting insiders can only place one 
order before they disclose their trade, which precludes stealth trading. 
3  The notion of discretionary liquidity trading was developed by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988).Theirs is a 
model of one exchange, but the argument extends easily to a setting where liquidity traders can trade simul-
taneously on multiple platforms. 
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indirect.4 As a result, the literature on stealth trading follows the pioneering work of Barclay 
and Warner (1993) and provides evidence for stealth trading indirectly by analyzing the in-
formativeness of trades of different sizes. They argue that small trades can be ignored. Large 
trades reveal more of the trader’s information. They have therefore a larger price impact, 
which makes them less profitable. Accordingly, medium-size trades provide an optimal trade-
off between the desired scale of the transaction and the objective to conceal information and 
are therefore the strategy of choice. The empirical method then infers stealth trading by dem-
onstrating that medium-size trades have a larger permanent impact on prices compared to 
small and large trades. This method has been applied successfully to analyze stealth trading in 
targets of tender offers or in stocks with large price movements relative to the market index.5 
The main limitation of this method is that the research design has to focus on stocks or events 
where significant firm-specific information is revealed, and that it is therefore biased towards 
information-based explanations. These papers also restrict their samples to a small number of 
stocks or options, to a short sample period, and to securities subject to abnormally large price 
changes. 
In this paper, we provide direct evidence on stealth trading by investigating a class of 
traders for whom we can directly identify their trades: the officers and directors of companies. 
We investigate how much and under what circumstances company insiders split their trades 
by looking at sequences of repeated trades in the same direction.6 Company insiders are a par-
ticularly suitable laboratory to investigate stealth trading. First, we can observe stealth trading 
directly. Second, we do not need to restrict the sample to firms that were subject to particular 
events or to particular price movements. We include all listed U.S. corporations over a sample 
period of 11 years from 1996 to 2006 for which we can obtain data, and our final sample cov-
ers 1.855 million individual transactions. Third, the issue of stealth trading is especially im-
                                                          
4  Chakravarty (2001) identifies the class of traders (institutional or individual) from the account type in the 
clearing records, but his data cannot identify individual traders. Keim and Madhavan (1995) provide some 
evidence on order break-up for trades of 21 institutional investors, but note that aggregation of orders in their 
data does not allow them to fully identify the number of trades used to fill one order. Alexander and Peterson 
(2007) argue that clustering of trades at sizes of 500, 1000, and 5000 shares is indicative of stealth trading. 
5  Barclay and Warner (1993), Chakravarty (2001), and Anand and Chakravarty (2007). 
6  We use the term “insider trading,” “insiders,” and related formulations exclusively in order to refer to legal 
trades as reported to the regulator by persons who are classified as insiders by applicable insider trading laws. 
The term “directors’ dealings” as used in the UK is too narrow for our purposes, as it does not include insid-
ers who are not directors or officers of the company. 
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portant for company insiders, because they supposedly gain their information by virtue of 
their relationship with the company. Their trading behavior is therefore of independent inter-
est and the subject of a separate and large literature. We investigate whether stealth trading 
allows insiders to gain additional advantages from their informational position through stealth 
trading.7 In 2002, about the middle of our sample period, the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) tight-
ened insider trading rules and we are also interested in the extent to which this change in 
regulation affects stealth trading. 
Our first step is to define stealth trading more precisely and to show that stealth trading 
by corporate insiders is pervasive and that sequences of trades in the same direction are the 
norm. In a second step, we formulate two groups of hypotheses based on the fact that the 
stock price change caused by a trade consists of two components. First, a permanent compo-
nent, reflecting the new fundamental information revealed by the trade. Second, a transitory 
component, which arises for microstructure reasons such as compensation to those who pro-
vide liquidity and who take on inventory risk. Since both components of price impact increase 
with transaction size, an insider can increase her trading profit by splitting her transactions 
into smaller trades and spread them over time, independently of whether she trades on private 
information or for liquidity reasons. 
Information-based explanations focus on the first, permanent component of stock price 
changes and assume that insiders are informed traders and that stealth trading allows them to 
use their private information more profitably. Barclay and Warner (1993) argue that informed 
traders have an incentive to spread their information over time. If private information is long-
lived, then they have an incentive to spread it over the entire period before this information 
becomes public. We find evidence for some information-based hypotheses but not for others. 
We adapt the information-hierarchy hypothesis known from the insider trading literature and 
argue that insiders with better access to private information should engage more in stealth 
trading. Our findings contradict this hypothesis if we pool observations across the whole sam-
ple, but the evidence by officers and directors supports the information-hierarchy argument 
                                                          
7  This is a large literature to which we cannot do any justice in this article. Bainbridge (1999) is a good survey. 
The earliest contributions we could trace are Rogoff (1964), Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Pratt and DeVere 
(1970), Scholes (1972), Jaffe (1974), and Finnerty (1976). Recent contributions include Fidrmuc, Goergen, 
and Renneboog (2006), Marin (2008), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2009). 
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for the period before the Sarbanes-Oxley act. Microstructure-based measures of asymmetric 
information and accounting-based measures of firms’ opacity and disclosure quality have 
mostly only marginal explanatory power. Finally, the disclosure of stealth trades does not 
generate larger announcement returns than the disclosure of non-stealth trades. 
The second group of explanations are liquidity-based explanations, which consider the 
temporary component of stock price changes and view insiders simply as large traders who 
use stealth trading in order to reduce the price impact of their trades. In a finitely liquid mar-
ket, large trades will have an impact on market prices even if trades are not caused by private 
information. Casual observations suggest that computerized trading has made this source of 
trade fragmentation more important in recent years, and that brokers and banks offer their cli-
ents services to route their orders systematically to exchanges and trading platforms to exploit 
changes in liquidity. From this perspective, insiders may act as discretionary liquidity traders. 
If liquidity motives dominate, then insiders should use stealth trading in illiquid markets, if 
more insiders trade simultaneously in the same direction, and whenever they are on the short 
side of the market so that trading becomes more difficult. We consistently find supporting 
evidence for all hypotheses based on the notion that stealth trading tries to minimize price im-
pact and to exploit market liquidity. We compare the explanatory power of information-based 
explanations and liquidity-based explanations of stealth trading and find that liquidity-based 
explanations have consistently more explanatory power, whereas the support for information-
based explanations is weaker and less consistent.8 
We investigate stealth trading in more detail by looking at transactions before and after 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley act. The Sarbanes-Oxley-Act (SOX) reduced the time in-
siders have to disclose their trades from up to forty calendar days to only two business days. 
During our sample period from 1996 to 2006, we observe a trend towards less stealth trading 
if we measure it by the volume of stealth trades compared to non-stealth trades, but an in-
crease if we measure it by the number of trades. Insiders adapted to the regulatory change by 
                                                          
8  The trades by Eric Schmidt reported at the beginning of the Introduction illustrate this point. He divested 
Google A-shares that he acquired through recent stock option exercises and the week where he conducted the 
transactions had the third-highest trading volume of any week in the entire year 2005, which is consistent 
with timing the liquidity of the market. By contrast, an information-based explanation is more difficult to 
sustain in this case as Google’s stock rose by 60% by the end of the year 2005 and dropped below the price at 
which Schmidt sold his shares only in the wake of the financial crisis more than four years later. 
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executing smaller stealth trades, by trading more frequently, and by concentrating stealth 
trades into shorter time intervals. Most other changes that differ in the period before and after 
the Sarbanes-Oxley act seem to be related to a steady increase in market liquidity, but unre-
lated to the change in regulation itself. In the second half of the sample period where liquidity 
is higher, liquidity-based explanations become economically less important, although they 
remain statistically significant. 
The argument proceeds as follows. We describe the main features of the relevant insti-
tutional framework and the construction of our data set in Section 2. In Section 3, we establish 
that stealth trading of corporate insiders actually exists. We develop our hypotheses on differ-
ent aspects of stealth trading and test them in Section 4. In Section 5 we extend the argument 
and perform several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Institutional framework and data 
2.1 Institutional framework 
According to Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, all insiders have to disclose 
their transactions to the SEC. Insiders are direct and indirect beneficial owners of more than 
ten percent of any class of equity securities and any director or officer of the issuer of equity 
securities (Section 16(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC rule 16a-2). Tradi-
tionally, insiders had to report their transactions on a monthly basis within 10 days after the 
end of each calendar month in which the transaction occurred (Form 4), which gave insiders 
up to forty days to disclose their trades. In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) changed this 
practice. Since August 29, 2002, insiders have to report their trades within two business days 
(SEC rule 16a-3(g)). Small acquisitions that do not exceed $10,000 in market value within six 
months (SEC rule 16a-6) are exempt from these reporting requirements. These small acquisi-
tions are not reported on Form 4 as usual insider transactions but on Form 5, which is due 
only within 45 days after the issuer's fiscal year end (SEC rule 16a-3(f)). 
2.2 Construction of the data set 
Our data source for insider transactions is the Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) provided by 
Thomson Reuters. IFDF collects information on three forms insiders have to file with the 
SEC: Form 3 (“Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities”), Form 4 (“Statement 
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of Changes of Beneficial Ownership of Securities”), and Form 5 (“Annual Statement of Bene-
ficial Ownership of Securities”). We include all open market purchases and sales as well as 
private transactions between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2006 with complete data (in-
cluding CUSIP, transaction date, and disclosure date) on IFDF. 
Insert Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 here 
Table 1 provides the details of the construction of our data set. Table 2 provides the defini-
tions of all variables used in our study. We motivate the definitions of our variables alongside 
the development of our hypotheses below. Table 3 displays some descriptive statistics for the 
variables in our data set. We extract 2,432,168 transactions for 137,806 insiders from 16,522 
firms. 26.7% of these transactions are purchases and the remaining 73.3% are sales. We lose 
about 15% of the observations because the firm is not listed on CRSP and another 2.7% be-
cause the stock data available on CRSP are insufficient to compute abnormal returns. We also 
delete all transactions where the number of shares in the transaction (as reported on IFDF) 
exceeds the number of shares traded on the exchange on the same day (as reported by CRSP); 
these transactions (about 5%) are most likely privately negotiated and therefore not of interest 
for our analysis. We have a small number of cases where insiders trade in different directions 
on the same day (about 0.7%) and where the transaction data on IFDF is incomplete (about 
0.3%). We delete these transactions. We are left with 1,855,068 transactions by 97,205 insid-
ers of 9,563 firms, or 76.3% of the raw data. Of these 20.9% are purchases and 79.1% are 
sales. For these transactions, we obtain several measures of companies’ opacity from 
Compustat and spreads and other measures of market liquidity from the TAQ database (see 
Table 2 for details). We lose up to 730,000 observations when calculating opacity measures 
because of missing information on required items on Compustat. We winsorize all Compustat 
variables at the first and the 99th percentiles, consistent with the literature on earnings man-
agement.9 We calculate several liquidity measures from the TAQ data and set variables to 
missing values if they are outside of their theoretical ranges.10 For this reason, the number of 
                                                          
9  See Francis et al (2005) and Cornett et al. (2008). 
10  For example, the adverse selection component as the percentage of the effective spread, Lambda, derived by 
Lin, Sanger and Booth, (1995) has to lie between zero and one. Therefore, we set it to missing if it does not 
fall into this range. 
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transactions with non-missing liquidity measures varies between 844,946 for Gamma and 
1,727,517 for QuotedSpread. 
3 Definition, existence, and patterns of stealth trading 
Definition. We regard a transaction as a stealth trade if there exists a subsequent transaction 
in the same direction and by the same insider before or on the same day where the first trans-
action is disclosed. The reason for this definition is that stealth trading is relevant only for the 
period where the information, respectively the trade, has not been disclosed.11 Disclosure re-
quirements changed with SOX on August 29, 2002. However, before and after SOX insiders 
did sometimes not comply with these regulations. We therefore use the actual rather than the 
mandated disclosure date to identify sequences of stealth trades. We define the maximum 
length of a stealth trading sequence to be 40 days. If the first trade of a stealth trading se-
quence is not reported after 40 days, then we consider this sequence to be finished to avoid 
sequences that stretch over extremely long periods.12 We consider alternative definitions of 
stealth trading as a robustness check below. 
3.1 Existence of stealth trading 
The first step of our analysis is to establish that stealth trading even exists. The evidence in 
the extant literature is indirect and does not establish a clear-cut criterion that defines stealth 
trading. We consider the clustering of trades by the same person in the same direction as evi-
dence for stealth trading. Absent stealth trading, insiders’ trades should be uncorrelated over 
time, i.e., if an insider executes purchases with probability p and sales with probability 1-p, 
then this unconditional probability should be equal to the conditional probability given that 
the last transaction was a sale. An analogous argument applies to purchases. We first perform 
univariate tests to see whether the unconditional probability and the conditional probability of 
a sale given the direction of the previous transaction are the same. In addition, we perform 
multivariate tests to control for other factors that may lead insiders to cluster their trades. 
                                                          
11  This is a conservative definition. Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001) analyze a model where insiders have 
to disclose their trades after every trading round and find that this disclosure requirement induces insiders 
play mixed strategies and to garble the information from disclosures by trading in the opposite direction of 
their information. Their setup strictly precludes stealth trading, but shows that insiders may possess private 
information even after they disclose their trade. 
12  These 40 days define the upper legal bound for reporting most insider trades before SOX became effective. 
 - 8 -
Insert Table 4 here 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results for the univariate tests. Since we need the sign of the 
previous transaction, the calculations do not include the first transaction for each person. 
Table 4 shows that trades cluster. In total, 20.9% of all transactions are purchases and 79.1% 
are sales (see Table 3). Yet, conditional on the previous transaction being a sale (purchase), 
the next transaction is also a sale (purchase) in 98.7% (96.8%) of all cases. We use a standard 
Chi-square test and Fisher’s exact test to test whether the direction of trades is independent 
from the direction of previous transactions and reject this hypothesis since the p-values are 
below 0.01% in both cases. We repeat the analysis for sub samples of the data where the next 
transaction occurs within six months (column 2), within 40 days (column 3) and within 2 days 
(column 4) of the first transaction. The six months restriction is motivated by the short-swing 
rule, which requires insider to disgorge all profits from trading in the opposite direction (e.g., 
first buying and then selling) in shares of their own company within six months. The 40-day 
restriction is motivated by the pre-SOX regulation, which gave insiders a maximum of 40 
days to disclose their trades. The 2-day restriction is motivated by the post-SOX regulation, 
which gives insiders a maximum of 2 business days to disclose their trades. As expected, we 
see that insiders are more likely to trade in the same direction if transactions are closer to each 
other, although these differences are economically insignificant. 
In Panel B of Table 4 we address the same question with a standard Probit model, where 
the dependent variable equals one if the transaction is a purchase, and regress it on the same 
dummy variable for the previous transaction (LagPurchase). Many papers document the in-
fluence of investor sentiment on investment decisions of retail investors and asset prices (see 
for example Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991). If insiders behave like retail investors we expect 
that they buy stocks more frequently if investor sentiment is high and sell stocks more fre-
quently if investor sentiment is low. In contrast, if insiders behave rationally we expect ex-
actly the opposite pattern because insiders may recognize that stocks are mispriced. In regres-
sion (2) in Table 4B we control for investor sentiment, by including CCI, the consumer confi-
dence index (following Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006), and in regression (3) by including 
Sentiment, the investor sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler (2006), as independent vari-
ables. The insider trading literature has shown that insiders often purchase (sell) shares after 
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periods of negative (positive) abnormal stock performance.13 Seyhun (2000) calls these con-
trarian trades passive transactions. We control for this insider behavior by including two addi-
tional independent variables in model (4) and (5): past stock performance measured by 
RunupCAR, the abnormal return over the 20 trading days before the transaction, and Stock-
Tercile, which is the tercile of the stock return in the calendar month before the transaction of 
all sample companies with sufficient data for this period. Both variables measure the relative 
development of firm’s stock price in the month before an insider transaction. Model (6) in-
cludes all four control variables. 
Across all these regressions, the coefficient of LagPurchase is close to 0.94, which 
means that the conditional probability that the next transaction is again a purchase is 94% if 
we evaluate the impact at the mean of all independent variables. This is economically signifi-
cantly different from its unconditional probability and statistically significant at all conven-
tional significance levels. The coefficients on CCI and Sentiment are statistically highly sig-
nificant (both t-statistics in Table 4 are in excess of 29). When including both measures in 
model (6) the coefficient of Sentiment and its significance is somewhat reduced. These results 
show that investor sentiment influences insiders similar to retail investors. However, the im-
pact of investor sentiment is economically small: a one standard deviation increase in CCI 
(Sentiment) increases the likelihood that the next transaction is a purchase by 1% (1.1%). The 
impact of StockTercile is negative, which shows that insiders are contrarians: if the stock has 
performed relatively well over the previous calendar month, then they are significantly less 
likely to purchase additional shares, where an upward move from the bottom to the middle, or 
from the middle to the top tercile reduces the probability by 2.5%.14 Interestingly, RunupCAR, 
the return relative to the index before the first transaction has no significant impact. All ob-
servations also hold for model (6), which includes all control variables. We therefore con-
clude from this analysis that stealth trading is pervasive. Insiders are much more likely to pur-
chase (sell) shares if the previous transaction was also a purchase (sale). Our subsequent dis-
                                                          
13  Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2002), Jenter (2005), and Fidrmuc, Korczak, and Korczak 
(2009) find that insiders on aggregate are contrarian investors. 
14  Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) find for the U.K. that abnormal returns before insider purchases 
(sales) are significantly negative (positive) and conclude that insiders can time their trades. 
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cussion formulates and tests hypotheses about how stealth trades differ from non-stealth 
trades and when and why stealth trading occurs. 
3.2 Patterns of stealth trading 
We aggregate sequences of stealth trades into aggregate trades and refer to these as aggregate 
stealth trades. If we analyze individual trades of a stealth trading sequence, we refer to them 
as single stealth trades. The aggregation of stealth trades is important because we are inter-
ested in the characteristics of the firms, the liquidity of the market for their stock, and the 
identity of the insiders rather than in the characteristics of individual trades. Aggregating 
stealth trades is particularly relevant when we wish to compare the volume or stake of stealth 
trades to those of single trades, because then we are interested in the size of the entire se-
quence and not only in the size of its components. 
Insert Table 5 here 
Volume is the volume of a transaction in thousand U.S. $ and Stake is the percentage of shares 
outstanding traded in the transaction. The univariate results in Table 5 show that single stealth 
trades are only about half as large as non-stealth trades (median Volume: $28,900 vs. $56,900, 
median Stake 0.004% vs. 0.011%). However, aggregate stealth trades are about four times 
larger than non-stealth trades (median Volume: $261,400 vs. $56,900, median Stake 0.049% 
vs. 0.011%). 
We also use the definition of trade size introduced by Barclay and Warner (1993). They 
define transactions as small if the number of shares is less than 500, as medium-size if the 
number of shares is at least 500 but less than 10,000, and as large if at least 10,000 shares are 
traded. Barclay and Warner (1993) find that the price impact is largest for medium-size trades 
and conclude that informed traders use stealth trading to camouflage their information by 
spreading their trades over time. We categorize all trades into three groups: SmallTrade (less 
than 500 shares), MediumTrade (500 to 9,999 shares), and LargeTrade (10,000 or more 
shares). The results in Table 5 show that most non-stealth trades (54.7%) and single stealth 
trades (54.3%) fall indeed into the category MediumTrade, which is in line with Barclay and 
Warner’s results (in their sample 45.7% of trades are medium-size) and corroborates their 
presumption that informed traders mostly execute medium-size transactions. However, in our 
sample small transactions make up only 16.4% of non-stealth trades and 28.4% of stealth 
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trades, compared to 52.6% in Barclay and Warner. The main difference between the two sam-
ples is that insiders execute many more large trades: 28.9% of non-stealth trades and 17.3% of 
stealth trades, compared to only 1.7% in the Barclay and Warner sample. Hence, insiders 
trade on average larger stakes than other investors in the stock market, which is unsurprising 
given that insiders also includes large shareholders with more than 10% ownership, who are 
wealthier and trade large stakes in the company. 
4 Who undertakes stealth trading and when? 
In this section, we develop and test two groups of hypotheses, information-based hypotheses 
and liquidity-based hypotheses. We develop and test six different hypotheses that potentially 
explain who undertakes stealth trading and when it is undertaken.  
We perform Probit analysis, where the dependent variable is Stealth, which is equal to 
one if the trade is an aggregated stealth trade, and zero otherwise. The use of this dependent 
variable is appropriate since insiders probably control whether their orders are split, but they 
may not control the precise extent to which they are split, which may be left to their interme-
diaries. Since all hypotheses refer to the same dependent variable, we combine these variables 
in one regression in order to avoid omitted variable bias. We collect the results in Table 6, but 
discuss each hypothesis and the respective variables in turn. 
Insert Table 6 here 
We group variables in Table 6 by the respective hypothesis and order them in the same order 
as we discuss them in the text. The table reports marginal effects calculated at the mean of all 
independent variables. In addition to variables associated with our hypotheses, we use two 
control variables and dummy variables that control for potential industry effects and for cal-
endar years to capture potential time trends. We control for size using LogMarketCap, the 
logarithm of the market capitalization of the company. We also enter SOX, a dummy variable 
that equals one for the period after August 28, 2002. We report the economic significance in 
the last column of Table 6. For all continuous variables economic significance is defined as 
the product of the regression coefficient in regression (3) and the standard deviation of the 
variable from Table 3. The entries in the last column can therefore be interpreted as the 
change in the probability of stealth trading from a one-standard deviation increase in the cor-
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responding independent variable. For dummy variables economic significance is simply the 
coefficient on the variable itself. 
Trade size. The most obvious source of price impact is the size of the order an insider wishes 
to place. It is not possible to assign trade size unambiguously to either information-based or to 
liquidity-based explanations. Insiders may wish to trade larger stakes because they have 
stronger informative signals or because of liquidity shocks. In both cases they would tend to 
break up these orders. 
Hypothesis 1 (Trade size): Stealth trading is more likely for larger (in aggregate) trades. 
We aggregate the stakes traded into deciles and define StakeDecile, which assigns the decile 
(highest=10, lowest=1) to each trade. Recall that we refer to aggregate stealth trades, so we 
compare non-stealth trades to entire stealth trading sequences. StakeDecile is the single most 
significant variable in all our regressions.15 If we move up one size decile, then the probability 
that this trade is broken up into a sequence of stealth trades increases by 8.8%, so the effect is 
not only statistically, but also economically large. 
4.1 Information-based hypotheses 
Information hierarchy. Several papers in the insider trading literature investigate the “in-
formation hierarchy hypothesis” (Seyhun, 1986), which holds that trades by those insiders 
who have more information have a higher price impact.16 We should therefore expect that in-
siders who are more informed and who have more information to hide will engage more in 
stealth trading because they face more adverse selection problems. 
Hypothesis 2 (Information hierarchy): Stealth trading is more likely for insiders who are 
more informed. 
                                                          
15  Using VolumeDecile instead of StakeDecile yields, qualitatively and quantitatively similar results (not tabu-
lated). 
16  In the literature on insider trading the information hierarchy hypothesis holds that trades by insiders who are 
closer to the firm have a larger information content. The evidence on this hypothesis is mixed. Seyhun (1986) 
shows that the directors and officers trade on more valuable information than other insiders. Lin and Howe 
(1990) show that trades by the CEO and the officers and directors of the firm have a higher information con-
tent than those of unaffiliated shareholders. Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) find no evidence for 
the information hierarchy hypothesis. 
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Based on our data we can distinguish between the CEO, officers other than the CEO, directors 
who are not officers, the chairman of the board, and other insiders who hold none of these 
roles. These are mostly large shareholders, who have to file their transactions if their owner-
ship exceeds 10% of the outstanding shares. 
The regression analysis in Table 6 includes dummy variables for all categories of insid-
ers except outside directors, so the coefficients for the four remaining insider groups have to 
be interpreted relative to the outside directors of the company. If we apply the information 
hierarchy hypothesis to stealth trading, then we should expect the coefficients on CEO, Chair-
man, and Officers all to be positive, because these groups should possess more inside infor-
mation than the other groups. It is also reasonable to expect that the coefficient on CEO is lar-
ger than the coefficient on Officers. By contrast, we expect the coefficient on OtherInsider to 
be negative as other insiders are only included by virtue of their large shareholdings, but they 
can obtain inside information only from their privileged access to information from the CEO 
and from the directors of the company. We find the expected coefficient for CEO, but it is 
sometimes insignificant, dependent on how we control for asymmetric information with dif-
ferent accounting-based measures. The coefficient on Officers is negative and always highly 
significant, whereas the coefficient on OtherInsider is always positive and also highly signifi-
cant. Both findings contradict the information hierarchy hypothesis. The coefficient on 
Chairman is always insignificant. The results for Officers and OtherInsider therefore contra-
dict the information hierarchy hypothesis, and those for CEO and Chairman lend no support, 
so overall our results are inconsistent with the implications of information hierarchy hypothe-
sis. Insiders with more access to information use stealth trading less, and those with less ac-
cess to information use it more. 
We suspect that the reasons for our findings are that the less informed insiders hold lar-
ger stakes and therefore also conduct larger transactions. We find this to be the case. Other 
insiders trade on average $416,100 or 0.083% of the company’s shares, which compares to 
$294,000 (0.026%) for the CEO, and $262,100 (0.021%) for other officers, and $279,300 
(0.033%) for outside directors. Only chairmen of the board trade similar dollar volumes of 
$420,500, although these account still for only 0.029% of their companies’ shares. This find-
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ing is more indicative of concerns about liquidity and price impact, an argument we develop 
in more detail below. 
Direction of trade. The insider trading literature has shown that purchases have a larger in-
formation content compared to sales, probably because sales are more likely to be motivated 
by liquidity considerations, whereas purchases are more likely to be motivated by information 
advantages.17 If stealth trading is a strategy to hide trades with a larger information content, 
then stealth trading should be related to the direction of trades. 
Hypothesis 3 (Direction of trade): Stealth trading is more frequent for purchases than for 
sales. 
We define Purchase as a dummy variable, which equals one for purchases and zero for sales. 
Table 6 shows that the coefficient of Purchase has the predicted sign in all specifications. The 
impact is economically small though: Stealth trading is about 0.82% to 1.69% more likely for 
purchases than for sales. 
Asymmetric information and opacity. Stealth trading should be more attractive if the gen-
eral scope for informed trading is larger. This will be the case if there is more asymmetric in-
formation, for example in companies that are more opaque, and in companies with more firm-
specific risk. Earnings announcements disclose significant new information, so that there 
should be more asymmetric information before earnings announcements. We therefore expect 
more stealth trading before earnings announcements and less stealth trading immediately after 
earnings announcements.18 
Hypothesis 4 (Asymmetric information and opacity): Stealth trading is: (1) more likely if 
there is more asymmetric information and if the company is more opaque; (2) more likely in 
stocks with more firm-specific risk; (3) more likely before and less likely after earnings an-
nouncements. 
                                                          
17  The first to make this observation was Rogoff (1964). See Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jeng, Metrick, and 
Zeckhauser (2003) or Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) for more recent analyses. The only study to 
find different results is Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2007), who find significant disclosure day returns for sales, 
but not for purchases. However, they analyze Form-5 transactions, which are different from ours. 
18  Aboody and Lev (2000) show that insider gains are larger for R&D-intensive firms and interpret R&D as a 
proxy for asymmetric information. Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) and Betzer and Theissen 
(2009) investigate the impact of news announcements on insider trading. 
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We investigate part (1) of Hypothesis 4 by looking at a range of measures of opacity. We use 
two measures of the quality of earnings disclosure. The first measure is AccrualsQuality, the 
measure of accruals quality developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) as amended by 
McNichols (2002), which measures the forecast error of abnormal accruals. The assumption 
behind this measure is that working capital accruals are more accurate forecasts of cash flows 
if the residuals of a regression of changes in working capital on realized cash flows and other 
controls are small. The measure of accruals quality is therefore the standard deviation of re-
siduals from this regression. The difficulty with AccrualsQuality in our context is that its 
computation requires accounting numbers that are not available for all firms in our sample, so 
that sample size is reduced by almost 40%. Our second measure of accounting disclosure 
quality is AQLoading and overcomes this limitation by using a factor mimicking approach. 
This measure was developed by Ecker et. al. (2006), who use the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
measure of accruals quality to sort firms into deciles. They then construct an accruals quality 
factor as the difference of the stock returns between the highest four deciles and the lowest 
four deciles of accruals quality. AQLoading for any firm is then defined as the slope coeffi-
cient from a regression of the firm’s excess stock return on the accruals quality factor after 
controlling for the standard Fama-French factors. We explain the construction of Accrual-
sQuality and AQLoading in more detail in the appendix. In the robustness section, we also 
report a specification that uses the modified Jones (1991) model to measure disclosure qual-
ity. 
Both measures of accounting disclosure quality in Table 6 are marginally significant 
with t-statistics between 1.70 and 1.92, which is small, in particular in view of the large sam-
ple size. The effects are also economically small: A one-standard deviation increase in Accru-
alsQuality increases the probability of stealth trading by 0.3%, and a one-standard deviation 
increase in AQLoading increases the probability of stealth trading by 0.2%. Hence, opacity as 
measured by AccrualsQuality and AQLoading has at most a small impact on the probability of 
stealth trading. 
We use two microstructure measures of information asymmetry. The first is Informa-
tionComponent, Stoll’s (2000) measure of the information component of the quoted spread. 
This measure is statistically insignificant in regressions (1), (2), (4), and (5) in Table 6. The 
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second measure is PIN, the probability of informed trading introduced by Easley et. al.(1996). 
We describe the calculation of both measures in more detail in the appendix. PIN is margin-
ally significant in the smaller sample where we control for disclosure quality by Accrual-
sQuality, and completely insignificant in the larger sample where we control for disclosure 
quality by AQLoading. 
Furthermore, R&D is defined as research and development expenditures scaled by total 
assets. R&D is set to zero for those firms where Compustat does not report any research and 
development expenditures, so that we measure this variable with some error. The results are 
still statistically highly significant and in line with the predictions from Hypothesis 4. How-
ever, economic significance is again small: a one standard deviation increase of R&D in-
creases the probability of stealth trading by about 0.6%.  
We analyze part (2) of Hypothesis 4 by using Volatility, defined as the annualized stan-
dard deviation of daily stock returns over the calendar month preceding the transaction. We 
use this as a measure of firm-specific risk.19 The effect is significant with the predicted posi-
tive sign, so more volatile firms have more stealth trading: A one-standard deviation increase 
in volatility leads to an 0.6% increase in the probability of stealth trading. 
We analyze Part (3) of Hypothesis 4 by looking at earnings announcements reported by 
Compustat. We define two dummy variables BeforeEarnAnnounce and AfterEarnAnnounce, 
which equal one for a period of two weeks (14 days) before, respectively, after an earnings 
announcement. The coefficient for BeforeEarnAnnounce is always positive. It therefore seems 
that insiders use stealth trading more frequently in periods when there is more asymmetric 
information. However, we do not find that insiders use less stealth trading after earnings an-
nouncements, when asymmetric information should be less severe, which contradicts 
Hypothesis 4 and the notion that stealth trading is used more in an environment where infor-
mation asymmetry is larger. The coefficient of AfterEarnAnnounce is positive and significant 
across all models. 
                                                          
19  Results do not change materially if we use the standard deviation of daily excess returns from a market 
model as a proxy for firm specific risk, where we use the CRSP-value weighted index over the preceding cal-
endar year as a measure of market risk. 
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4.2 Liquidity-based hypotheses 
Liquidity. We expect that stealth trading is more attractive if the price impact of trades is 
large, which is the case in illiquid markets and for larger trades. The attractiveness for insiders 
to break up larger trades rather than smaller trades is further increased if there are fixed costs 
from trading. 
Hypothesis 5 (Liquidity): Stealth trading is more likely in less liquid stocks. 
Liquidity is a somewhat elusive concept and the literature has developed different measures.20 
We use only two different measures in Table 6 to conserve space and report results for an-
other five measures in the robustness section. The first proxy is EffectiveSpread, which is de-
fined as t t t tES 2 P Q Q= − , where Qt is the midpoint of the quotes and Pt is the price at 
which the transaction is executed (see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001). The second 
proxy is QuotedSpread, which is the quoted relative spread, i.e., the difference between the 
bid price and the ask price, scaled by the midpoint. We average both spread measures for all 
trades during the day and assign the spread measure of the first day of a stealth trading se-
quence to the aggregated stealth trade. 
A limitation of testing Hypothesis 5 with our methodology is that both, EffectiveSpread 
and QuotedSpread may also be higher because traders anticipate the arrival of informed trad-
ers. We attempt to control for the information component of the spread by entering Informa-
tionComponent as well as PIN, but these controls may be imperfect. We therefore want to 
break up the quoted spread into a component related to information and a pure liquidity com-
ponent. We do this by interacting InformationComponent with QuotedSpread. QuotedSpread 
is a relative spread since it is scaled by the midpoint, and InformationComponent is defined to 
lie between zero and one, so that the interactive term can be interpreted as the information-
related portion of the quoted spread. We also enter the complement, i.e. (1-
InformationComponent)*QuotedSpread, which we then interpret as the non-information re-
lated component of the spread. We also used the decomposition of the effective spread pro-
posed by Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) and find similar results (not tabulated). 
                                                          
20  See Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) for a recent analysis of liquidity measures. 
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Stealth trading is more prevalent in firms with illiquid stocks. The effects are statisti-
cally highly significant independently of the spread measure chosen. Our results are therefore 
in line with Hypothesis 5. The economic effects are several times larger than those for many 
of the information-related variables we discussed above, but still not nearly of the same mag-
nitude as trade size itself. 
Trading environment. We expect that the inclination to break up trades depends also on the 
competition for liquidity in the market. It should be easier to sell shares in rising markets 
when there is more demand, and to buy shares in falling markets, when there is a larger sup-
ply. It will be on average more difficult to be on the short side of the market, i.e., buy when 
other investors want to buy and vice versa. Hence, we expect that stealth trading is more 
likely if insiders are on the short side of the market.21 We also hypothesize that that insiders 
wish to split their trades if several insiders trade at the same time. We can see several reasons 
why insiders may trade simultaneously. First, many companies impose blackout periods that 
restrict the time windows where insiders are allowed to trade, e.g. after earnings announce-
ments, so that insiders trade simultaneously in the same trading window.22 Second, many in-
siders exercise stock options and sell their shares at the same time when they receive new 
stock options.23 This event typically occurs on the same date for all insiders of the same firm. 
In principle, insiders may also trade at the same time because they simultaneously observe the 
same information, but this should not lead to more stealth trading. In fact, the theoretical 
analysis of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) shows that in a market where multiple insiders 
try to profit from the same long-lived information, insiders concentrate their trades into a 
shorter period of time and therefore engage in less stealth trading. 
Hypothesis 6 (Trading environment): (1) There is more stealth buying in rising markets and 
more stealth selling in falling markets. (2) There is more stealth trading if more insiders trade 
in the same direction at the same time. 
                                                          
21  See Chiyachantana et. al. (2004) and Chakravarty, Kalev, and Pham (2005). 
22  Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) show that about 92% of their sample firms impose trading restrictions for 
insiders and that the most common trading window is 3 to 12 days after earnings announcements. 
23  See Ofek and Yermack (2000) for stock sales after option exercises and Klein and Maug (2009) for stock 
sales and exercises of existing options when executives receive new options. 
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We cannot measure the direction in which other traders want to trade directly and infer it from 
recent price movements instead. We conduct this analysis at the firm level and classify insider 
transactions according to the recent share price performance of the insider’s company assum-
ing that it is more difficult for insiders to buy (sell) shares if the stock of their company has 
over (under) performed compared to all other stocks in the market. We classify a stock as 
overperforming if its return was in the top tercile of all stock returns in the sample in the 
month before the transaction. Analogously, a stock is underperforming if its return was in the 
bottom tercile in the previous month. (This classification corresponds to one used in the defi-
nition of StockTercile, which we used above.) We then define a dummy variable ShortSide, 
which equals one if the transaction is on the short side of the market, i.e., if the transaction is 
a purchase and the stock was over performing, and also if the transaction is a sale and the 
stock was underperforming. Under Hypothesis 6, we should see that the coefficient on Short-
Side is positive, so that there is more stealth buying if the stock outperformed and more 
stealth selling if the stock underperformed. The results in Table 6 show that the coefficient of 
ShortSide always has the predicted sign and it is highly significant in all regressions. We 
therefore conclude that insiders use stealth trading more often when they are on the short side 
of the market for their own stock. 
Hypothesis 6(2) holds that insiders tend to use more stealth trading if other insiders also 
trade in the same direction. This claim is corroborated by the positive and highly significant 
coefficient for the dummy variable MultipleInsiders, which is one if more than one insider 
trades in the same direction on the same day. The impact of this variable is statistically and 
economically large. The likelihood of stealth trading increases by more than 5% if at least one 
other insider is trading in the same direction. 
We believe that these explanations can also help to understand the puzzling finding that 
the coefficient on AfterEarnAnnounce has a positive sign, the opposite of what we predict in 
Hypothesis 4(3) under the assumption that the impact of this variable is driven by informa-
tional considerations. If companies restrict trading windows to a period after their earnings 
announcements, or if all insiders receive new options and therefore sell stock from exercising 
their old options, then insiders of such companies know that many other insiders will trade 
simultaneously. From Table 3 we can see that the mean of AfterEarnAnnounce is 0.200, so 
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20.0% of the sample transactions are executed in the two weeks after an earnings announce-
ment. With a uniform distribution of trades over the year and four earnings announcements 
per year, we should expect only 15.4% of all transactions to be executed in the two weeks af-
ter an earnings announcement.24 Insider trades are therefore biased to the weeks after earnings 
announcements. In such a situation stealth trading offers insiders the possibility to reduce the 
price impact of their transactions by matching them with those of more liquidity traders. 
4.3 Comparison of explanatory power 
We find strong evidence supporting the interpretation that insiders split their trades to take 
better advantage of market liquidity and reduce price impact, but also some evidence in favor 
of information-based explanations. We now compare the explanatory power of both groups of 
hypotheses by employing two different methodologies and report the results in Table 7. 
Insert Table 7 here 
Both methods rely on regression (3) in Table 6 as our baseline specification. We choose this 
regression because it splits the spread into an information component and a pure transaction 
cost component, so that all variables can be assigned either to the information-based explana-
tions or to liquidity-based explanations. We then estimate restricted models where we remove 
either the information-related variables or the liquidity-related variables. For the information-
based explanations we separately remove those variables that have the predicted sign in the 
baseline regression according to our hypotheses, and then the variables that have the opposite 
sign compared to our predictions. 
We report two tests. First, we report the likelihood ratio test statistic, which is twice the 
drop in the log-likelihood from removing the variables in the restricted regression. Second, 
we estimate linear probability models, which allow us to calculate the R-squareds of each re-
gression. We do not report the coefficient estimates for the linear probability models, which 
are similar to those from the Probit models. We then report the partial R-squared, which we 
define as the decrease in the R-squared from excluding variables in the restricted regression. 
The results in Panel A of Table 7 show that most of the explanatory power comes from 
liquidity-related variables. The comparison shows that the liquidity-based variables have 
                                                          
24  About 99.9% of our sample transactions come from firms that file quarterly reports; therefore, 8 out of 52 
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jointly more explanatory power than the information-based variables. First, all liquidity-
related variables have the predicted sign, whereas several information-related variables do 
not. Second, the explanatory power of the liquidity-related variables is larger than those of 
information-related variables that have the predicted sign: The likelihood ratio test statistic for 
liquidity-related variables is more than three times larger (782 compared to 242) and the par-
tial R-squared is about twice as large (0.31% compared to 0.16%) compared to the corre-
sponding statistic for information-related variables. 
5 Extensions and robustness checks 
5.1 Stealth trading before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
We are interested in whether stealth trading was affected by the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.25 We first split the sample into pre-SOX transactions before August 28, 2002 and 
into post-SOX transactions after that date. Again, we choose regression (3) from Table 6 as 
our baseline specification. 
Insert Table 8 here 
We find differences for some of the coefficients. The most interesting impact is on the behav-
ior of insiders. The coefficient on Officer is negative only after SOX. Interestingly, the coeffi-
cient on Chairman, which is insignificant if we run the regression on the entire sample period, 
is now significant, with a positive sign before SOX and a negative sign after SOX. Hence, the 
coefficients on Officer and Chairman are consistent with the information hierarchy hypothesis 
before SOX, but not after SOX. Stealth trading by OtherInsiders declines by about 40% after 
SOX. 
Some of the variables related to asymmetric information also change. The coefficient on 
Volatility is significant only before SOX and the coefficients on BeforeEarnAnnounce and 
AfterEarnAnnounce both decline dramatically and BeforeEarnAnnounce becomes insignifi-
cant. This is also consistent with the notion that insiders became more cautious to use stealth 
trading around information sensitive events like earnings announcements. In Panel B of Table 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
weeks per calendar year (15.4%) fall into the category AfterEarnAnnounce. 
25  A recent literature investigates the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on insider trading as well as a range of 
other governance-related issues. See Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2007) and Brochet (2008) on insider trading 
and Brockman, Martin, and Puckett (2008) on stock option exercises. 
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7 we repeat all tests from Panel A of the same table separately for the period before and after 
SOX. Interestingly, we find that the explanatory power of all hypotheses is reduced, but that 
for liquidity-based explanations declines more than that for information-based explanations. 
Our suspicion from this analysis is that the sample split into a pre-SOX and a post-SOX 
period may capture other developments than the incidence of SOX. In particular, liquidity in-
creases by all measures we employ: EffectiveSpread declines by almost 50% from 1.4% to 
0.8% and Turnover is higher by 25% in the post-SOX period. These changes may be related 
to an increase in computerized trading and a general reduction in transaction costs and may 
therefore be unrelated to SOX. To test for this, we split the sample into transactions where 
EffectiveSpread is above the median and those where EffectiveSpread is below the median. 
The correlation between the sample split according to EffectiveSpread and according to the 
passage of SOX is sufficiently low to permit a separate analysis.26 Regressions (3) and (4) of 
Table 8 show that our suspicion is justified. In fact, the changes in the coefficients for all 
categories of insiders suggest that all insiders use stealth trading less compared to directors 
after SOX and when markets are more liquid. Also, BeforeEarnAnnounce, and ShortSide be-
have similarly for a pre/post-SOX split and split into high/low EffectiveSpread subsamples. 
We therefore conclude that the association of changes in these variables with the Sarbanes-
Oxley act is spurious. There is a large increase in the coefficient on R&D in the high liquidity 
subsample, which is not matched by a corresponding increase in the post-SOX period. Also, 
the large decline in the coefficient on Volatility in the post-SOX period does not seem to be 
related to an increase in liquidity. 
We are also interested in other dimensions in which insiders’ behavior may have 
changed because of SOX. Most likely, insiders benefit from concealing their trades from 
other traders is lost or at least diminished once the first trade is disclosed, and after SOX in-
siders have only two business days instead of up to 40 days until they have to disclose their 
trades (see Section 2.1 above). We therefore hypothesize that stealth trading declines after 
SOX became effective and that insiders attempt to squeeze stealth trades into a shorter period. 
Univariate comparisons suggest that this is the case (results not tabulated). The time span be-
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tween the first and the last trade of a stealth trading sequence declines from 8.14 days to 1.33 
days, as expected. The time between two consecutive stealth trades declines from 1.89 days to 
0.17 days. At the same time, stealth trades become smaller by all measures (volume and stake 
per transaction and also for aggregate sequences of trades). However, we cannot be sure that 
these changes are causally related to SOX because these developments may reflect a general 
time trend. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Panel A of Figure 1 shows a positive trend in the proportion of stealth trades of all insider 
transactions that begins in 1998 and continues until the end of our sample period, without in-
dicating a structural break at any particular date. The decline between 2002 and 2004 does not 
seem to be related to SOX and the temporary drop in the time series occurs several months 
later, in January 2003. The number of transactions in a stealth trading sequence in Panel B 
also increases and triples from about 4 to about 12 during our sample period, without showing 
any clear relation to SOX. We therefore expect that the change in transaction technologies, 
especially computerized trading, and the possibility to execute a larger number of transactions 
automatically drive stealth trading and that SOX had little influence on these developments. 
We address the impact of SOX more rigorously by running time-series regressions. We 
aggregate variables by calculating averages across all transactions in a particular calendar 
month and then estimate a simple AR(1) process for each. We add Trend, a deterministic 
trend, which is defined as the number of months from the beginning of our sample period, and 
the SOX dummy, which equals one after SOX and zero before. 
Insert Table 9 here 
We define StealthVolume as the size in dollars of the aggregate volume of a stealth trading 
sequence, and StealthProportion as the ratio of the dollar volume of all stealth trades relative 
to the dollar volume of all insider trades in a given month. The impact of SOX on Stealth-
Volume is insignificant if we control for a time trend, but not if Trend is not included (Panel 
B). StealthProportion fluctuates in the 75% to 85% range before SOX and regression (2) im-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
26  For 265,436 or 62% of the trades in the sample where stealth trades are aggregated, the split according to 
EffectiveSpread is the same as the one according to SOX whereas for 162,284 (38%) of the sample these 
splits differ. 
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plies that SOX causes a decline of 13.8% in the proportion of stealth trades relative to all in-
sider trades. Regression (3) shows that TimeSpan, the number of days between two stealth 
trades declines by 0.88 days because of SOX, a result we expected because disclosure is now 
more timely. Delay, the difference in days between the transaction date and the reporting date 
declines by 20.22 days after SOX, so the new disclosure regulation has a strong effect. 
Altogether, these results show that insiders moderately reduced the usage of stealth trad-
ing after SOX. The strongest impact of SOX is that insiders split their transactions into a lar-
ger number of smaller trades, execute these trades faster, so that trades became more concen-
trated in a much shorter time span. They then disclose these trades sooner to comply with the 
new regulation. Most other changes during our sample period seem to be the results on a 
steady trend towards higher market liquidity and unrelated to the Sarbanes-Oxley act. 
5.2 Stealth Trading on NYSE and on NASDAQ 
We would like to compare our main results for stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) to those listed on NASDAQ. We therefore run regression (3) from Table 6 separately 
for NYSE stocks and for NASDAQ stocks and report the results in Table 8. Regression (3) 
shows the results for the NYSE subsample and regression (4) shows the results for the 
NASDAQ subsample. Most coefficients have the same signs and significance levels as in 
Table 6, but there are some noteworthy differences. For NASDAQ firms the interactive term 
with InformationComponent is larger than for NYSE firms, whereas the non-information re-
lated part is larger for NYSE firms. Similarly, the effects of CEO, Purchase, Volatility, R&D, 
and SOX are all stronger for NASDAQ firms than they are for NYSE firms. In fact, the coef-
ficients for SOX become insignificant for NYSE firms and the coefficient for Volatility even 
changes signs. 
Our findings support the notion that information-based explanations have more explana-
tory power for NASDAQ firms than for NYSE firms. This is plausible, as we would expect 
NASDAQ firms to be smaller, more volatile, and more opaque firms. We test for this by re-
peating the analysis with likelihood ratio tests and partial R-squareds in Panel C of Table 7. 
Our conjecture is only partially correct. While the statistics for information-related variables 
that have the predicted sign is much larger in the NASDAQ sample than in the NYSE sample, 
those variables that have the opposite of the predicted sign for the NASDAQ sample also be-
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come more significant. In particular, officers use stealth trading much less in the NASDAQ 
sample. Liquidity-related variables have the same explanatory power for companies on both 
exchanges. 
5.3 Robustness checks 
We perform a range of robustness checks on our empirical design. Our first concern is that the 
definition of the dependent variable defines stealth trading differently for the period before 
and after SOX because our definition depends on the actual disclosure date. We argue above 
that this is justified because trades are no longer stealth once the first trade in a sequence has 
to be disclosed. We now take a different approach and define Stealth to equal one for a se-
quence of trades within seven days of the first trade, independently of whether any trades 
were disclosed in the meantime or not. 
Insert Table 10 here 
Table 10 shows the results for the alternative definition of Stealth. The changes compared to 
Table 6 are mostly small. The coefficient on CEO declines in magnitude and also in signifi-
cance, as does the coefficient on Purchase. The coefficient on AQLoading doubles in size and 
becomes significant, but the economic significance is still modest. The coefficient on Be-
foreEarnAnnounce changes signs and becomes insignificant. None of these results affects our 
conclusions materially and we conclude that our findings are robust to the definition of the 
dependent variable. 
We use AccrualsQuality and AQLoading as measures of accounting disclosure quality 
in Table 6. Another commonly used measure is AbnormalAccruals, the prediction errors from 
forecasts from the modified Jones (1991) model. For better comparison with the literature, we 
report the results for AbnormalAccruals in regression (2) of Table 10. AbnormalAccruals it-
self is completely insignificant and does not seem to pick up any relevant aspect of opacity for 
our purposes. For the other coefficients, there are hardly any noteworthy changes. The only 
variables that are statistically significant and change by more than 40% in magnitude are Af-
terEarnAnnounce, which increases from 0.0119 to 0.0166, and Volatility, which increases 
from 0.0110 to 0.0170. Most likely, these variables now capture aspects of asymmetric infor-
mation and opacity that were picked up by AQLoading in the baseline regression in Table 6. 
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Our choice of liquidity measures in Table 6 was also highly selective and we employ a 
range of other liquidity measures and report the results in regressions (3) – (7) of Table 10. 
We use the Amihud measure based on Amihud (2002), which is defined as the ratio of the 
daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day (regression 3). Following the 
argument of Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999), LOT measures the roundtrip transaction 
costs for buying and selling, which are estimated using maximum likelihood (regression 4, 
see the appendix). We estimate the measure of price impact proposed by Stoll (2000) as a co-
efficient from the regression of the daily price change on the daily trade imbalance between 
share volumes of purchases and sales on day t. Some of the literature relates trading volume 
to market liquidity (e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995), although the strength and sig-
nificance of this relationship is not clear (for a critical point of view see Lesmond, 2005). We 
include Turnover, defined as the total number of shares traded on the day of the transaction 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding (regression 6). The theoretical justification 
for Lambda follows from Kyle (1985) and our calculations follow the regression approach of 
Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995). We use their measure Lambda as a measure of the information 
component of the effective spread as well as their measure Gamma as the order processing 
cost component of the spread (see the appendix and regression 7). 
All liquidity measures except PriceImpact are highly significant with t-statistics ranging 
from 2.17 for Amihud to 12.04 for Gamma. The less liquid a stock is, i.e., the higher the 
spread and the lower turnover, the higher is the incidence of stealth trading, showing that 
stealth trading is concentrated in infrequently traded, illiquid stocks. We also check for eco-
nomic significance by multiplying the coefficients on the liquidity measures in Table 10 with 
their standard deviations to evaluate the impact of a one-standard deviation change in the re-
spective liquidity measure. Interestingly, Turnover has the largest impact on the likelihood of 
stealth trading: A one-standard deviation increase in Turnover reduces the probability of 
stealth trading by 3.7%. Our conjecture is that insiders monitor trading volume as a proxy for 
liquidity, and then place stealth trades at times when volume is low, but place larger trades 
and non-stealth trades when volume is high. The coefficients on the other variables are not 
greatly affected by the inclusion of particular liquidity measures and we conclude that our re-
sults are robust to our choice of liquidity measure. 
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5.4 Price impact on disclosure dates 
If the motivation behind stealth trades is to conceal information, then stealth trades should 
systematically contain more information than non-stealth trades. We should therefore expect 
that the disclosure of stealth trades contains a stronger signal than the disclosure of non-
stealth trades. We measure the impact on stock prices by using standard event study methods. 
Abnormal returns are calculated over a 1-day event window using market model benchmark 
returns calculated with the CRSP value-weighted index. The event day is the disclosure of the 
first trade in a stealth trading sequence or the disclosure date of non-stealth trades. We calcu-
late abnormal returns on the disclosure date separately for purchases (PurchaseAR) and for 
sales (SalesAR). 
Insert Table 11 here 
From the point of view of information-based explanations the impact of disclosing stealth 
sales should be more negative than non-stealth sales, and the impact of stealth purchases 
should be more positive than that for non-stealth purchases. We therefore run separate regres-
sions for purchases and for sales and expect a negative sign for sales and a positive sign for 
purchases. The results from regressions in Table 11 suggest that stealth trades do not have 
more information content than non-stealth trades. The coefficients for Stealth are economi-
cally insignificant in all regressions. The coefficient for Stealth has different signs for univari-
ate regressions than for multivariate regressions; it only has the predicted sign in the univari-
ate regressions, but is then statistically insignificant for sales. Therefore, we find no support 
for the hypothesis that stealth trades contain more information than non-stealth trades. There 
is no discernible difference in the information impact of insiders’ stealth trades and their non-
stealth trades. 
6 Conclusion 
Our analysis provides direct evidence that insiders in the U.S. engage in stealth trading and 
split large orders into sequences of smaller transactions. Almost 87% of all insider transac-
tions are part of a sequence of stealth trades during our sample period from 1996 to 2006. We 
distinguish between two groups of explanations. Information-based explanations hold that 
insiders have private information about the fundamental value of the stock and therefore split 
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their trades in order to maximize the profitability of their trades. By contrast, liquidity-based 
explanations argue that insiders act like discretionary liquidity traders who spread small trans-
actions to reduce the temporary price impact that occurs for microstructure reasons and is un-
related to asymmetric information. 
We develop several hypotheses that all emphasize the information content of trades and 
argue that insiders should use stealth trading with more access to private information, more 
for purchases than for sales, and more in firms that are more opaque and where informational 
asymmetries are larger. Some of our findings support the assumption that insiders use stealth 
trading more if they want to conceal information. The results on firms’ disclosure quality 
weakly support information-based explanations but depend on the particular measure of dis-
closure quality we choose. The insider trading literature argues that purchases are more likely 
to be driven by fundamental inside information compared to sales, which are more likely 
driven by liquidity considerations. Consistent with information-based explanations we find 
more stealth trading for purchases than for sales, although this finding is concentrated in the 
pre-SOX period where market liquidity is lower. Other findings are inconsistent with infor-
mation-based explanations. The insider trading literature argues that the CEO and the officers 
of the company possess more information compared to other insiders. However, we find that 
those insiders use stealth trading most who are not officers or directors of the company and 
who should have the least access to information. Finally, we also expect that stealth trades 
reveal more information than non-stealth trades, but we find no support for this hypothesis 
from looking at stock price reactions to the disclosure of stealth trades compared to the dis-
closure of non-stealth trades. 
With respect to liquidity-based explanations, we hypothesize that insiders break up 
trades when their orders are large when the stock is less liquid for reasons other than informa-
tion asymmetry. We find evidence for both hypotheses, independently of which liquidity 
measure we use. Insiders use stealth trading more frequently when they are on the short side 
of the market, i.e. when they purchase in rising markets and when they sell in falling markets. 
They also use stealth trading more when several insiders trade the same stock at the same 
time, particularly in the period after earnings announcements. Finally, the insiders with the 
highest inclination to engage in stealth trading fall into the category of “other insiders,” 
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mostly large shareholders who are not officers or directors of the company. While they have 
less direct access to information, they do trade larger stakes. Overall, we find that the explana-
tory power of liquidity-based explanations is higher than that of information-based explana-
tions, but it declines in the second half of the sample where liquidity is higher. 
There are some limitations inherent in our research design. We cannot determine 
whether stealth trading is successful in reducing price impact. For this, we would have to 
compare the price impact of stealth trades to the hypothetical price impact of the same order 
had it not been broken up. There is no good methodology we know that would allow us to 
conduct this counterfactual analysis. 
In this paper, we analyze a very specific group of investors. Our focus on insiders al-
lows us to track their trading behavior with greater precision than we could do for other inves-
tors, but the specific characteristics of insiders may limit the extent to which we can general-
ize our conclusions. It seems plausible that insider trades have a higher likelihood of being 
induced by private information than trades by other shareholders, which would bias our find-
ings in favor of information-based explanations of stealth trading. 
Finally, we cannot address the methods insiders use in order to break up their trades. 
Very large trading sequences like the one by Eric Schmidt we mention in the Introduction 
suggest that some insiders use computerized algorithms, but the median stealth trading se-
quence has only three trades. We expect that a significant part may be undertaken by interme-
diaries on behalf of insiders. More research, and probably more detailed data, is necessary to 
address these questions. 
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Appendix: Computational routines for variables 
For all microstructure variables, we use the TAQ database, provided by the NYSE, to extract 
the necessary intraday transaction data. For each trade we assign the bid and ask quotes pre-
vailing at least one second before the trade took place.27 The final data set contains the fol-
lowing items for each transaction: 
1) Date and timestamp (up to seconds) 
2) Transaction price (Pt) 
3) Transaction volume in shares (wt) 
4) Prevailing bid quote (Bt) 
5) Prevailing ask quote (At) 





A BQ += ). We use Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm to classify trades into buys and 
sells. We classify trades with a transaction price above the quote midpoint ( t tP Q> ) as buys 
and those with a transaction price below the quote midpoint ( t tP Q< ) as sells. If a transaction 
price is equal to its quote midpoint, we compare the current transaction price with the previ-
ous transaction price. If the current one is below the previous one ( 1t tP P−< ), we consider it to 
be a sell; if it is above the previous one ( 1t tP P−> ), we consider it to be a buy. 
Decomposing the effective spread (Lin, Sanger, and Booth 1995) 
Lambda (λ ) represents the adverse selection component as a percentage of the effective 
spread. Following Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995), we estimate it as a coefficient from the re-
gression of change in quotes on the one-half signed effective spread (zt=pt –qt): 
1 1t t t tq q z eλ+ +− = ⋅ + , 
                                                          
27  Henker and Wang (2005) consider this procedure to be more appropriate compared to the classical Lee and 
Ready (1991) five-second rule. Bessembinder (2003) tries zero- to thirty-second delays in increments of five 
seconds and does not find any differences in the results. 
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where qt is the logarithm of the quote midpoint at time t  and pt is the logarithm of the transac-
tion price at time t. 
Theta (θ ) measures order persistence. It is estimated as a coefficient from the following 
AR(1) process: 
1 1t t tz zθ η+ += + . 
The error terms 1te +  and 1tη +  are assumed to be uncorrelated.  
Gamma (γ ) reflects the order processing costs as a percentage of the effective spread. We 
estimate it as a coefficient from the regression of difference in transaction prices on the one-
half signed effective spread (zt=pt – qt): 
1 1t t t tp p z uγ+ +− = − ⋅ + . 
Information Component (Stoll 2000) 
The information component of the quoted spread is a daily measure, which we calculate as: 
1 TradedSpreadInfoComp
QuotedSpread
= − , 
where 
1 1
1 1( ) ( )m nA Bt tt tTradedSpread P Pm n= =
= −∑ ∑  and 11 ( )T t ttQuotedSpread A BT == −∑ . 
T denotes the total number of transactions over the day, m – the number of transactions at the 
ask (buys) and n – the number of transactions at the bid (sells), so that T m n= + .28 PAt  is the 
transaction price at the ask (the transaction price of a buy) and PBt is the transaction price at 
the bid (the transaction price of a sell). Our definition gives all trades the same weight. As ro-
bustness check, we also calculate volume-weighted averages and obtain similar results. 
PIN (Easley et al. 1996) 
The probability of informed trading is the ratio of informed traders to the total number of 
traders of a particular stock: 
                                                          
28  Please note that T is the same for transactions and for quotes, since each transaction is associated with the 
single prevailing bid and ask quote. We do not include the non-matched quotes in our analysis, because we 
believe that only those quotes matter at which a transaction takes place. 
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2
PIN α μα μ ε
⋅= ⋅ + ⋅ , 
where α  is the probability of arrival of new information, μ  is the arrival rate of informed 
traders andε  is the arrival rate of liquidity-based buyers and sellers (here: assumed to be 
identical). We estimate these parameters by maximizing the likelihood function as derived by 
Easley et al. (1996): 
( )
( )
( ) ( )( , ) (1 )*
! !
( ) [( ) ]*
! !



























where B denotes the number of buys over the day I and S denotes the number of sells over the 
day I. The parameter δ is the probability that the information is negative. Since days are con-
sidered to be independent, the likelihood function over I days is simply the multiplication of I 
daily likelihood functions. We obtain convergence for 96% of all 106,634 firm-quarters.29 
LOT (Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka 1999) 
According to Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), the LOT measure represents the propor-
tional round-trip transaction costs for the marginal investor: 
2 1j jLOT α α= − , 
where 1 jα ( 2 jα ) is the threshold for trades on the negative (positive) information of the firm 
j’s stock. We estimate both of these parameters by maximizing the following likelihood func-
tion: 
                                                          
29  We use a SAS program, published on the web-site of Noah Stoffman, http://kelley.iu.edu/nstoffma/. 
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Rjt  and Rmt denote the daily returns of the firm j and of the market, respectively; ,jβ is the firm 
j’s return sensitivity to the market and jσ  is the standard deviation of firm j’s returns. Φ () is 
the distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and φ () is the standard normal 
density function. Finally R1  (R2) is the set of all days with non-zero returns and negative 
(positive) market returns and R0 is the set of all days with zero returns. We obtain conver-
gence for 99.99% of our sample.  
Price Impact (Stoll 2000) 
We use the approach of Stoll (2000) to measure the price impact over the day in response to 
the daily trade imbalance. The price impact coefficient is 1β  in the following regression: 
0 1 2 1t t t tP I I eβ β β −Δ = + ⋅ + ⋅ + , 
where tPΔ  is the daily change price, measured as 1(1 )t t ItC C R−− + ; tC  is the closing quote 
midpoint on day t and RIt  is the daily return on the S&P 500 index. tI  is the percentage im-



















where Aiw and 
B
iw are the share volume of transactions at the ask (sells) and transactions at 
the bid (buys), respectively. 
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Accruals Quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002, as amended by McNichols 
2002). 
AccrualsQuality is the standard deviation of firm j’s residuals ( ,j tυ ) calculated over a 5-year 
rolling window. The residuals are obtained from the cross-sectional regression, following 
Francis et. al (2005): 
, . 1 ,
0, 1, 2,
, , ,
, 1 , ,
3, 4, 5, ,
, , ,
Re
j t j t j t
j j j
j t j t j t
j t j t j t
j j j j t










Δ+ + + +
, 
where: 
TCAj,t = firm j’s total current accruals in year t 
Assetsj,t = firm j’s average total assets in year t and t-1 
CFOj,t = firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t 
,Re j tvΔ = firm j’s change in revenues (Compustat item #12) between year t-1 and year t 
,j tPPE = firm j’s gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item #7) in year t 
AQLoading (Ecker et al. 2006) 
AQLoading captures the sensitivity of firm j’s returns to the accruals quality factor (AQFac-
tor). The variable AQfactor is constructed following the same procedure as in Fama and 
French (1993). All firms are assigned to AccrualsQuality deciles on the first day of each 
month. This dynamic approach is possible due to differences in fiscal year ends of different 
companies. The AQfactor is then the difference in daily returns between the 4 bottom deciles 
and the 4 top deciles based on accruals quality. The estimation of AQLoading proceeds by 
including AQfactor as an additional factor into the classical Fama-French 3-factor framework: 
, , , , , , , , , ,( ) .j t F t j T j T M t F t j T t j T t j T t j TR R R R s SMB h HML AQLoading AQfactor− = + − + + + +α β ε  
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Tables 
Table 1: Sample design 
This table displays how our sample is constructed from raw Thomson Reuters Insider Filing database (IFDF) 
data to our final sample. We include all open market and private transactions in the IFDF database (Table One) 
between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2006 in our initial dataset. We report the losses of observations after 
matching the IFDF data with CRSP, because of missing information, and consistency checks. 
 Trans-actions % Firms Insider 
IFDF data 2,432,168 100.0% 16,522 137,806 
Observations lost because of:     
   Missing stock data on CRSP 372,463 15.3%   
   Missing price or volume information on IFDF 6,526 0.3%   
   Purchases and sales by the same insider on the same day 17,089 0.7%   
   # shares traded > total # of shares traded at the same day 116,316 4.8%   
   Insufficient data for event window or estimation period 64,706 2.7%   
Final sample 1,855,068 76.3% 9,563 97,205 
 
 
Table 2: Variable definitions 
This table defines all variables used in this paper. Insider trading data are taken from IFDF, accounting data from 
Compustat, market data from CRSP and intraday transaction data from TAQ. 
Variable Description Source 
Abnormal 
Accruals 
Absolute value of abnormal accruals, obtained using the ap-
proach of Jones (1991) as modified by Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1995) 
Compustat 
AccrualsQuality The measure of accruals quality of Dechow and Dichev 
(2002), as amended by McNichols(2002). For estimation de-




1 for all transactions executed in the 14 days after an earnings 
announcement (if available), zero otherwise 
Compustat 
Amihud Amihud’s measure of illiquidity, defined as the ratio of the 
daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day 
(Amihud, 2002) 
CRSP 
AQLoading The measure of sensitivity of firm j’s returns to the poor earn-
ings quality in year T (Ecker et al. 2006). For estimation de-




1 for all transactions executed in the 14 days before an earn-
ings announcement (if available), zero otherwise 
Compustat 
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Variable Description Source 
CCI Consumer confidence index based on a monthly survey of 
5,000 U.S. households conducted for The Conference Board. It 
averages five component indices, each of which is based on a 
question regarding current or expected economic conditions 
Data-stream
CEO 1 if trade is executed by the CEO, zero otherwise IFDF 
Chairman 1 if trade is executed by the chairman of the supervisory board, 
who is not an officer, zero otherwise 
IFDF 
Delay Number of days between trading day and disclosure day IFDF 
Director 1 if trade is executed by a member of the board (not including 
the chairman) who is not an officer, zero otherwise 
IFDF 
EffectiveSpread Daily average of t t t2 P Q Q− , where Qt is the quote midpoint 
and Pt is the price at which a transaction is executed; observa-
tions with EffectiveSpread>0.5 are set to missing values 
TAQ 
Gamma The order processing costs as a percentage of the effective 
spread, based on Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995). For estima-
tion details, please refer to the Appendix . Observations out of 




Information component of the quoted spread based on 
Stoll(2000) and defined as 1-TradedSpread/QuotedSpread. 
For further calculation details, please refer to the Appendix . 
Observations out of range between 0 and 1 are set to missing 
values. 
TAQ 
Lambda An adverse selection component of the effective spread, based 
on Lin, Sanger , Booth (1995). For estimation details, please 
refer to the Appendix . Observations out of range between 0 
and 1 are set to missing values. 
TAQ 
LargeTrade 1 if number of shares traded is ≥10,000, zero otherwise IFDF 
LogMarketCap Natural logarithm of market capitalization CRSP 
LOT The LOT measure of transaction costs, defined as roundtrip 
proportional transaction costs from buying and selling; based 
on Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999). For estimation de-
tails, please refer to the Appendix . 
CRSP 
MarketCap Market value of equity at the transaction date in million € CRSP 
MediumTrade 1 if number of shares traded is ≥500 and <10,000, zero other-
wise 
IFDF 
MultipleInsiders 1 if more than one insider trades on the same day in the same 
direction, zero otherwise 
IFDF 
NumberTrans Number of transactions executed in one stealth trading se-
quence 
IFDF 
Officer 1 if trade is executed by an officer (not including the CEO) IFDF 
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Variable Description Source 
OtherInsider 1 for all insiders who are not classified as an officer, chairman, 
director, or CEO 
IFDF 
PIN Probability of informed trading, calculated as the ratio of the 
informed traders to the total number of traders on a particular 
stock. First proposed by Easley et al. (1996). For estimation 
details, please refer to the Appendix .  
TAQ 
PriceImpact The measure of price impact as proposed by Stoll (2000) is a 
coefficient from the regression of daily price change on the 
daily trade imbalance between share volumes of purchases and 
sales on day t. For estimation details, please refer to the Ap-
pendix . 
TAQ 
Purchase 1 if the transaction is a purchase, zero otherwise IFDF 
PurchasesAR Abnormal return (market model) at the disclosure day for pur-
chases 
IFDF 
R&D Research and development expenditure / total assets Compustat 
QuotedSpread Average daily quoted bid-ask spread, scaled by the quote mid-
point; observations with QuotedSpread>0.5 are set to missing 
values 
TAQ 
RunupCAR Cumulative abnormal return over a 20-day event window 
(-20,-1) ending one day before the trading day for sales and 
purchases; CARs of sales are multiplied by -1 
CRSP 
Sales Sales of the last calendar year in million € Compustat 
SalesAR Abnormal return (market model) at the disclosure day for sales CRSP 
Sentiment Monthly sentiment index, taken from Baker and Wurgler 
(2007); based on first principal component of six (standard-
ized) sentiment proxies over 1966-2005 data. 
Baker and 
Wurgler 
ShortSide 1 for purchases if StockTercile=3; 1 for sales if StockTer-
cile=1; zero otherwise 
CRSP 
SmallTrade 1 if number of shares traded <500, zero otherwise IFDF 
SOX 1 if trade is executed after August 28, 2002, zero otherwise IFDF 
Stake Number of shares traded by insider / total number of shares IFDF/ 
CRSP 
StakeDecile Decile of the Stake traded in the transaction of all sample 
transactions, ranging between 1 (lowest) and 10 (highest) 
IFDF/ 
CRSP 
Stealth 1 for all transactions of a trading sequence, where all trades  
are in the same direction. The last transaction is always before 
or on the day the first transaction is disclosed or within 40 
days of the first transaction, whichever is earlier. 
IFDF 
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Variable Description Source 
StockTercile Tercile of the firm's stock return in the previous calendar 
month of all sample firms’ stock returns, ranging from 1 (low-
est) to 3 (highest) 
CRSP 
Theta The measure of order persistence based on Lin, Sanger and 
Booth (1995). For estimation details, please refer to the Ap-
pendix . Observations out of range between 0 and 1 are set to 
missing values. 
TAQ 
Turnover Total number of shares traded on the transaction day / total 
number of shares outstanding 
CRSP 
Volatility Annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 
preceding calendar month 
CRSP 




Table 3: Summary statistics 
This table displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in our analysis. Insider trading data are taken from 
IFDF, accounting data from Compustat, market data from CRSP and intraday data from TAQ. 
Variable N Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max 
Skew-
ness Kurtosis
AbnormalAccruals 1,128,807 0.068 0.046 0.089 0.000 1.914 6.8 97.5
AccrualsQuality 1,141,852 0.063 0.047 0.050 0.001 0.727 2.7 16.5
AfterEarnAnnounce 1,855,068 0.200 0 0.400 0 1 1.5 3.2
Amihud 1,854,967 0.700 0.004 9.108 0.000 1,944.8 71.9 9,028.5
AQLoading 1,838,259 0.307 0.081 1.230 -34.266 64.972 1.2 34.2
BeforeEarnAnnounce 1,855,068 0.045 0 0.206 0 1 4.4 20.5
CCI 1,855,068 107.117 105.100 17.782 61.4 144.7 0.3 2.6
CEO 1,855,068 0.177 0 0.382 0 1 1.7 3.9
Chairman 1,855,068 0.037 0 0.189 0 1 4.9 25.1
Delay 1,855,068 21.010 4 74.931 0 3,635 15.9 405.5
Director 1,855,068 0.244 0 0.430 0 1 1.2 2.4
EffectiveSpread 1,714,399 0.85% 0.34% 1.50% 0.00% 50.00% 5.9 65.5
Gamma 844,946 0.020 0.000 0.123 0.000 1.000 7.2 53.9
InformationComponent 1,247,972 0.658 0.726 0.266 0.000 1.0 -0.7 2.4
Lambda 1,665,297 0.400 0.386 0.271 0.000 1.000 0.2 1.9
LOT 1,833,471 0.021 0.012 0.030 -0.041 1.804 4.6 52.4
MarketCap (in million $) 1,855,068 8,521 761 30,968 0.2 571,816 7.5 75.5
MultipleInsiders 1,855,068 0.400 0 0.490 0 1 0.4 1.2
NumberTrans 230,223 7.003 3 18.880 2 1744 32.7 2,047
Officer 1,855,068 0.379 0 0.485 0 1 0.5 1.2
OtherInsider 1,855,068 0.162 0 0.369 0 1 1.8 4.4
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Variable N Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max 
Skew-
ness Kurtosis
PIN 1,670,900 0.154 0.139 0.087 0 1 1.5 9.8
PriceImpact 1,695,900 0.037 0.005 0.431 -65.554 207 296.9 137,901
Purchase 1,855,068 0.209 0 0.407 0 1 1.4 3.0
PurchasesAR 147,357 0.002 0.000 0.044 -0.514 1.012 1.9 27.3
QuarterlyReport 1,770,028 0.999 1 0.038 0 1 -26.4 699.8
QuotedSpread 1,727,517 1.41% 0.66% 2.19% 0.02% 40.00% 4.6 36.7
R&D 1,770,028 0.047 0.000 0.096 0.000 3.956 9.4 239.5
RunupCAR 473,002 -0.030 -0.019 0.181 -8.928 3.130 -2.6 66.1
Sales (in million $) 1,736,672 3,371 466 12,962 0 345,977 13.3 244.5
SalesAR 325,645 -0.001 -0.002 0.034 -0.692 1.293 1.8 55.3
Sentiment 1,516,826 0.105 -0.070 0.654 -0.830 2.500 1.1 4.1
ShortSide 1,855,068 0.233 0 0.423 0 1 1.3 2.6
SOX 1,855,068 0.588 1 0.492 0 1 -0.4 1.1
Stake 1,855,068 0.036% 0.004% 0.234% 0.000% 65.804% 56.9 7,212.3
Stealth 1,855,068 0.869 1 0.337 0 1 -2.2 5.8
StockTercile 1,836,305 2.185 2 0.820 1 3 -0.4 1.6
Turnover 1,855,068 0.017 0.007 0.071 0.000 14.228 39.9 2,915.2
Volatility 1,838,268 0.517 0.409 0.405 0.011 15.589 4.3 53.7
Volume (in thousend $) 1,855,068 301 31 3,289 0 883,742 167.0 41,278.2
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Table 4: Existence of stealth trading 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
This table displays the percentage of transactions which are followed by a transaction in the same direction 
(separated for purchases and sales). Please note that the total number of transactions is reduced and the percent-
age of sales is different compared to the original sample because the first transaction of each individual insider in 
each firm can only be used as benchmark for the next transaction by the insider in the respective firm. The Chi²-
test on independence and the Fisher exact test are based on the contingency table expressing the relationship 
between sales and purchases conditional on the prior direction of trade. 





first for each 
person 
Only within 
183 days of 
each other 
Only within 
40 days of 
each other 
Only within 
2 days of 
each other 
Same Direction     
     Sales 98.67% 99.65% 99.84% 99.97%
     Purchases 96.82% 98.66% 99.36% 99.85%
% Sales / Total 80.51% 81.03% 82.05% 84.08%
# of observations 1,737,495 1,628,811 1,513,281 1,283,510
Chi²-test (p-value) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Fisher exact test (p-value) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
 
Panel B: Probit regressions 
The table presents results for Probit regressions with Purchase as dependent variable. See Table 2 for a definition 
of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of 
the independent variables) and in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for a coefficient equal to zero. 
In all regressions t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Additionally, we report 
McFadden’s R2 and the p-values of the F-test with the null-hypothesis of the coefficient of LagPurchase being 
equal to its unconditional mean. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LagPurchase 0.9387 0.9364 0.9350 0.9370 0.9387 0.9324 
 (814.48) (807.27) (757.35) (786.28) (814.78) (728.77) 
CCI  0.0006    0.0005 
  (37.90)    (25.08) 
Sentiment   0.0161   0.0043 
   (29.70)   (6.47) 
StockTercile    -0.0250  -0.0320 
    (-79.56)  (-77.15) 
RunupCAR     -0.0018 0.0057 
     (-1.19) (3.12) 
Observations 1,737,495 1,737,495 1,405,871 1,720,191 1,737,495 1,392,727
Pseudo R² 0.842 0.843 0.834 0.846 0.842 0.838 
LagPurchase = 0.195 (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) 
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Table 5: Summary statistics: non-stealth vs. stealth trades 
This table compares descriptive statistics for 8 variables, which we use in our analysis for stealth and non-stealth 
transactions. See Table 2 for a definition of all variables. For each variable, the table displays the p-value of the 
two-sided t-test on the equality of means and the p-value of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
N Mean Median N Mean Median T-test Wilcox-on test Variable 
Non-stealth trades Single stealth trades   
SmallTrade 242,779 0.164 0 1,612,289 0.284 0 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
MediumTrade 242,779 0.547 1 1,612,289 0.543 1 (0.1%) (0.1%) 
LargeTrade 242,779 0.289 0 1,612,289 0.173 0 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Volume 242,779 480.6 56.9 1,612,289 274.3 28.9 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Stake 242,779 0.066% 0.011% 1,612,289 0.031% 0.004% (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Purchase 242,779 0.369 0 1,612,289 0.185 0 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
 Non-stealth trades Aggregated stealth trades   
SmallTrade 242,779 0.164 0 230,223 0.038 0 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
MediumTrade 242,779 0.547 1 230,223 0.354 0 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
LargeTrade 242,779 0.289 0 230,223 0.608 1 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Volume 242,779 480.6 56.9 230,223 1,920.8 261.4 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Stake 242,779 0.066% 0.011% 230,223 0.219% 0.049% (0.0%) (0.0%) 
Purchase 242,779 0.369 0 230,223 0.251 0 (0.0%) (0.0%) 
PurchasesAR 89,632 0.002 0.000 57,725 0.003 0.000 (0.5%) (51.4%)
SalesAR 153,147 -0.001 -0.001 172,498 -0.001 -0.002 (93.7%) (0.0%) 
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Table 6: Determinants of stealth trading 
The table presents results for Probit regressions with Stealth as the dependent variable. See Table 2 for a defini-
tion of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the marginal effects (evaluated at the mean 
of the independent variables) and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test with a null-hypothesis of a 
coefficient equaling zero. In all regressions t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. We 
also report McFadden’s R². All regressions include calendar year dummies and industry dummies. The economic 
significance is calculated based on the marginal effects from model (3). For AccrualsQuality the economic sig-
nificance is calculated based on its marginal effect from model (6) 
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    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   Economic significance




 (192.1) (192.2) (192.2) (153.5) (153.5) (153.6)     
CEO 0.0156 0.0157 0.0156 0.0050 0.0050 0.0049  0.0156 
 (4.48) (4.51) (4.48) (1.14) (1.13) (1.11)   
Officer -0.0128 -0.0127 -0.0128 -0.0220 -0.0219 -0.0220  -0.0128 
 (-5.42) (-5.36) (-5.40) (-7.15) (-7.12) (-7.15)   
Chairman 0.0069 0.0066 0.0065 -0.0092 -0.0094 -0.0096  0.0065 
 (1.08) (1.04) (1.02) (-1.14) (-1.17) (-1.19)   








  (18.61) (18.55) (18.56) (12.61) (12.56) (12.57)   




 (6.33) (6.05) (5.99) (2.60) (2.38) (2.30)     
AccrualsQuality       0.0518 0.0522 0.0519  0.0026 
    (1.70) (1.71) (1.70)   
AQLoading 0.0017 0.0018 0.0017     0.0021 
 (1.84) (1.92) (1.89)      
InformationComponent 0.0073 -0.0003  0.0056 -0.0021    
 (1.80) (-0.06)  (1.06) (-0.39)    
PIN -0.0009 0.0007 0.0004 0.0327 0.0345 0.0339  0.0000 
 (-0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (1.74) (1.83) (1.81)   
R&D 0.0572 0.0606 0.0602 0.0665 0.0703 0.0700  0.0058 
 (4.47) (4.73) (4.70) (4.12) (4.35) (4.34)   
Volatility 0.0139 0.0150 0.0142 0.0101 0.0120 0.0110  0.0057 
 (3.82) (4.17) (3.92) (2.09) (2.49) (2.29)   
BeforeEarnAnnounce 0.0155 0.0156 0.0156 0.0139 0.0141 0.0141  0.0156 
 (3.19) (3.21) (3.20) (2.20) (2.23) (2.22)   








  (5.69) (5.65) (5.66) (3.96) (3.95) (3.96)   
EffectiveSpread 1.0754   1.2204        
 (12.19)   (10.06)     
QuotedSpread  0.7927   0.8403    
  (13.66)   (10.93)    
InfoComp*QuotSpread   0.7235   0.7522  0.0114 
   (10.68)   (8.57)   








   (8.58)   (6.83)     
ShortSide 0.0119 0.0118 0.0118 0.0137 0.0135 0.0135  0.0118 
 (5.06) (4.98) (4.98) (4.42) (4.34) (4.34)   
MultipleInsiders 0.0526 0.0528 0.0528 0.0537 0.05384 0.0539  0.0528 H
. 6
 
  (26.28) (26.37) (26.39) (20.77) (20.81) (20.83)   
 LogMarketCap 0.0498 0.0504 0.0506 0.0520 0.0524 0.0526   0.1064 
  (59.90) (60.27) (60.63) (47.82) (48.06) (48.25)   
 SOX -0.0382 -0.0394 -0.0389 -0.0327 -0.0336 -0.0332  -0.0389 
    (-5.19) (-5.35) (-5.29) (-3.58) (-3.69) (-3.65)     
 Observations 307,546 307,540 307,540 186,979 186,976 186,976     
  Pseudo R² 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.153 0.153 0.153     
 Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     
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Table 7: Comparisons of explanatory power 
The table presents results for the comparison of the explanatory power of our different hypotheses and groups of 
hypotheses. In each column the log likelihood of the restricted model (without the variables associated with the 
respective hypothesis), the Likelihood ratio test statistic (Chi² test) and the 1% cut-off level for this test are re-
ported for Probit regressions with Stealth as the dependent variable. Each column also reports the R² of the re-
stricted model and the partial R², which is defined as the difference of the R² of the full model and the restricted 
model, for OLS regressions with Stealth as the dependent variable. The full model includes CEO, Officer, Chair-
man, OtherInsider, Purchase, AQLoading, PIN, R&D, Volatility, BeforeEarnAnnounce, AfterEarnAnnounce, 
StakeDecile, InfoComp*QuotSpread, (1-InfoComp)*QuotSpread, ShortSide, MultipleInsiders, LogMarketCap, 
SOX, year and industry dummies. See Table 2 for a definition of all variables. 
Panel A: Pooled sample 
The log likelihood of the full Probit model (pooled sample) is -181,373 and the R² of the full OLS model is 
0.1900. 
Hypothesis  Information  Liquidity 
 
 predicted sign 
opposite 
sign  
    (1) (2) (3) 
Log Likelihood (restricted) -181,494 -181,636 -181,764 
Chi² test 242 526 782 
1% cut-off level 21.67 11.34 11.34 




Partial R-Squared 0.0016 0.0021 0.0031 
 
Panel B: pre/post-SOX 
The log likelihood of the full Probit model for pre-SOX (post-SOX) sub sample is -78,780 (-101,129) and the R² 
of the full OLS model is 0.2364 (0.1643), respectively. 
Hypothesis  Information  Liquidity 
 
 predicted sign 
opposite 
sign  
    (1) (2) (3) 
Log Likelihood (restricted) -78,937 -78,928 -79,267 
Chi² test 313 295 973 
1% cut-off level 21.67 11.34 11.34 





Partial R-Squared 0.0034 0.0031 0.0072 
Log Likelihood (restricted) -101,185 -101,271 -101,187 
Chi² test 111 283 115 
1% cut-off level 18.48 15.09 11.34 






Partial R-Squared 0.0022 0.0029 0.0023 
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Panel C: NYSE/NASDAQ 
The log likelihood of the full Probit model for NYSE (NASDAQ) sub sample is -77,694 (-99,546) and the R² of 
the full OLS model is 0.1966 (0.1951), respectively. 
Hypothesis  Information  Liquidity 
 
 predicted sign 
opposite 
sign  
    (1) (2) (3) 
Log Likelihood (restricted) -77,728 -77,782 -77,868 
Chi² test 68 176 348 
1% cut-off level 21.67 11.34 11.34 




Partial R-Squared 0.0023 0.0028 0.0041 
Log Likelihood (restricted) -99,669 -99,717 -99,741 
Chi² test 245 341 389 
1% cut-off level 20.09 13.28 11.34 






Partial R-Squared 0.0026 0.0028 0.0034 
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Table 8: Sample splits: pre/post-SOX and NYSE/NASDAQ 
The table presents results for Probit regressions with Stealth as dependent variable. See Table 2 for a definition 
of all variables. For each independent variable, the table displays the marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of 
the independent variables) and, in parentheses, the t-statistic for the two-sided t-test for a coefficient equal to 
zero. In all regressions t-values are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. We also report McFad-
den’s R². 
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Pre-SOX Post-SOX High spread 
Low 
spread NYSE NASDAQ
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




  (139.7) (130.1) (139.0) (132.3) (124.0) (142.3) 
CEO 0.0126 0.0127 0.0202 0.0070 0.0092 0.0205 
 (2.27) (2.81) (4.18) (1.38) (1.61) (4.61) 
Officer 0.0093 -0.0266 -0.0084 -0.0199 0.0018 -0.0207 
 (2.65) (-8.21) (-2.49) (-5.89) (0.49) (-6.53) 
Chairman 0.0290 -0.0206 0.0264 -0.0210 0.0162 0.0002 
 (3.13) (-2.31) (2.97) (-2.28) (1.56) (0.03) 








 (16.00) (10.76) (16.38) (7.85) (12.32) (13.73) 




  (13.75) (-2.90) (8.66) (-2.28) (0.80) (7.67) 
AQLoading 0.0021 0.0013 0.0020 -0.0015 0.0025 0.0003 
 (1.46) (1.01) (1.73) (-0.89) (1.24) (0.28) 
PIN -0.0277 0.0347 -0.0327 0.0370 0.0163 -0.0205 
 (-1.62) (1.58) (-2.09) (1.39) (0.70) (-1.21) 
R&D 0.0540 0.0722 0.0478 0.1303 0.1321 0.0559 
 (2.88) (4.05) (3.35) (4.25) (3.42) (3.92) 
Volatility 0.0239 0.0009 0.0107 0.0195 -0.0224 0.0169 
 (5.06) (0.14) (2.58) (2.54) (-2.83) (3.94) 
BeforeEarnAnnounce 0.0239 0.0046 0.0275 0.0000 0.0054 0.0251 
 (3.17) (0.71) (4.14) (0.01) (0.69) (3.99) 








  (6.51) (2.14) (3.74) (4.39) (3.91) (3.89) 
InfoComp*QuotSpread 0.6039 0.8374 0.5157 1.3100 0.6104 1.1258 
 (6.14) (8.69) (6.98) (4.59) (6.24) (9.95) 
(1-InfoComp)*QuotSpread 0.5806 2.1102 0.8571 7.0244 1.4534 0.8795 H
. 5
 
  (4.37) (8.02) (6.94) (4.85) (5.33) (6.61) 
ShortSide 0.0147 0.0089 0.0132 0.0094 0.0154 0.0091 
 (4.22) (2.75) (4.02) (2.74) (4.17) (2.92) 
MultipleInsiders 0.0928 0.0171 0.0519 0.0530 0.0545 0.0498 H
. 6
 
  (30.64) (6.33) (17.79) (19.03) (17.54) (18.46) 
 LogMarketCap 0.0551 0.0496 0.0532 0.0566 0.0457 0.0535 
  (44.60) (41.79) (35.92) (44.53) (35.22) (41.30) 
 SOX   -0.0248 -0.0607 -0.0029 -0.0823 
      (-2.45) (-5.50) (-0.26) (-8.15) 
 Observations 140,210 167,280 148,847 158,643 132,489 170,253 
  Pseudo R² 0.188 0.127 0.159 0.144 0.154 0.153 
 Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9: The impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on trading behavior 
This table presents results for time series regressions with the aggregated Volume of stealth trading transactions 
(StealthVolume), the proportion of stealth trades of all insider transactions measured by Volume (StealthPropor-
tion), the time span between single stealth trades in days (TimeSpan) and the reporting delay of insider transac-
tions in days (Delay) as dependent variables. Trend is a variable that equals zero for January 1996 and increases 
by one for each month after that. All models include CEO, Officer, Chairman, OtherInsider, Purchase, AQLoad-
ing, R&D, Volatility, BeforeEarnAnnounce, AfterEarnAnnounce, StakeDecile, EffectiveSpread, ShortSide, Mul-
tipleInsiders, and LogMarketCap as control variables. See Table 2 for a definition of all variables. All variables 
are measured as monthly averages. For each reported independent variable, the table displays the slope estimate 
and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors, which also allow for autocorrelation of one lag. 
Panel A 
  StealthVolume Stealth Proportion TimeSpan Delay 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LagDepVar -0.0167 -0.1855 0.2187 0.4664 
 (-0.25) (-1.81) (2.22) (5.94) 
SOX -474.3171 -0.1381 -0.8827 -20.2239 
 (-1.46) (-5.32) (-7.57) (-7.84) 
Trend -8.4714 0.0013 -0.0075 0.0440 
 (-2.25) (3.29) (-3.55) (1.35) 
Observations 131 131 131 131 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 




  StealthVolume Stealth Proportion TimeSpan Delay 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LagDepVar -0.1405 -0.2181 -0.0161 0.2217 
 (-2.07) (-2.21) (-0.15) (2.67) 
SOX -1,270.3730 -0.1692 -1.0950 -21.6098 
 (-2.03) (-3.90) (-6.65) (-7.21) 
Observations 131 131 131 131 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10: Robustness checks  
The table presents results for Probit regressions with Stealth as dependent variable. Model (1) uses an alternative 
definition of Stealth as dependent variable, here a stealth trading sequence can only last for 7 days, however the 
disclosure of a prior trade within a period of 7 days does not terminate the sequence. Model (2) includes Abnor-
malAccruals from the Jones (1991) model as measure for opaqueness. Models (3) to (7) use different measures 
of liquidity, the header of the table reports the measure used for each column. Coefficients for each of the liquid-
ity measures are reported in the line LiquidityMeasure. See Table 2 for a definition of all variables. For each 
independent variable, the table displays the marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of the independent variables) 
and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided t-test for a coefficient equal to zero. In all regressions t-values 
are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. We also report McFadden’s R². 
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model Amihud LOT 
Price 
Impact Turnover Lambda
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




  (215.02) (157.40) (191.82) (191.56) (191.68) (180.83) (152.99)
CEO 0.0090 0.0029 0.0163 0.0161 0.0162 0.0157 0.0171 
 (2.70) (0.67) (4.68) (4.62) (4.65) (4.52) (3.87) 
Officer -0.0051 -0.0248 -0.0125 -0.0128 -0.0124 -0.0127 -0.0199 
 (-2.29) (-8.21) (-5.27) (-5.39) (-5.24) (-5.36) (-6.57) 
Chairman 0.0048 -0.0115 0.0085 0.0075 0.0086 0.0079 0.0118 
 (0.80) (-1.45) (1.34) (1.18) (1.35) (1.24) (1.49) 








 (21.22) (13.64) (18.89) (18.67) (18.84) (19.04) (15.40) 




  (2.83) (2.99) (7.46) (6.82) (7.56) (7.18) (6.54) 
AQLoading 0.0037  0.0022 0.0016 0.0024 0.0029 0.0023 
 (3.81)  (2.36) (1.70) (2.61) (3.10) (1.94) 
AbnormalAccruals  -0.01037      
  (-0.63)      
InformationComponent   0.0106 0.0111 0.0109 0.0076 -0.0103 
   (2.62) (2.75) (2.70) (1.85) (-1.89) 
PIN 0.0190 -0.0154 0.0067 0.0019 0.0046 0.0014 0.0371 
 (1.55) (-0.86) (0.50) (0.15) (0.34) (0.11) (2.22) 
R&D 0.0896 0.0469 0.0599 0.0544 0.0596 0.0594 0.0534 
 (7.26) (2.90) (4.68) (4.22) (4.65) (4.65) (3.22) 
Volatility 0.0201 0.0170 0.0206 0.0116 0.0217 0.0308 0.0210 
 (6.02) (3.87) (5.60) (3.04) (6.03) (7.40) (4.63) 
BeforeEarnAnnounce -0.0044 0.0154 0.0159 0.0159 0.0160 0.0172 0.0093 
 (-0.96) (2.44) (3.28) (3.26) (3.29) (3.54) (1.52) 








 (7.5) (5.6) (5.7) (5.7) (5.7) (5.8) (2.5) 
InfoComp*QuotSpread 0.8144 0.6846           
 (15.67) (8.36)      
(1-InfoComp)*QuotSpread 0.8157 0.9904      
 (15.67) (7.03)      
LiquidityMeasure   0.0007 0.5283 0.0014 -0.5249 0.0349 
   (2.17) (8.34) (0.78) (-3.99) (5.46) 








              (12.04) 
ShortSide 0.0164 0.0109 0.0519 0.0526 0.0520 0.0544 0.0670 
 (7.34) (3.60) (25.94) (26.24) (25.96) (25.78) (26.35) 
MultipleInsiders 0.0398 0.0535 0.0120 0.0116 0.01218 0.0113 0.0155 H
. 6
 
 (20.92) (21.04) (5.07) (4.92) (5.16) (4.80) (5.13) 
 LogMarketCap 0.0566 0.0507 0.0461 0.0484 0.0457 0.0463 0.0423 
  (72.29) (47.31) (59.46) (57.68) (59.59) (59.20) (43.65) 
 SOX -0.0120 -0.0285 -0.0366 -0.0339 -0.0372 -0.0363 -0.0671 
    (-1.74) (-3.27) (-4.98) (-4.59) (-5.03) (-4.93) (-7.09) 
 Observations 347,351 193,170 307,546 306,617 306,815 307,546 179,242
  Pseudo R² 0.164 0.158 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.149 0.178 
 Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 11: Abnormal disclosure day returns and stealth trading 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with abnormal disclosure day returns as dependent variable. The 
1-day event window is the disclosure date of the first transaction of a series of stealth trades or the disclosure 
date of a non-stealth trade. See Table 2 for a definition of all variables. For each independent variable, the table 
displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the p-value of the two-sided t-test for zero slope. In all OLS re-
gressions t-statistics are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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  Purchases Sales Purchases Sales 
 OLS OLS (Winsorized 1%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Stealth 0.0007 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0002 0.0003 
 (2.72) (-4.23) (0.07) (2.71) (2.74) (-3.91) (-1.59) (2.47) 
StakeDecile  0.0006  0.0000  0.0005  0.0000 
   (8.5)  (0.1)  (8.3)  (1.4) 
CEO  0.0001  0.0004  0.0002  0.0004 
  (0.15)  (1.74)  (0.37)  (1.73) 
Officer  0.0005  0.0002  0.0006  0.0002 
  (1.63)  (0.96)  (1.95)  (1.74) 
Chairman  0.0010  0.0002  0.0012  0.0001 
  (0.92)  (0.46)  (1.29)  (0.36) 
OtherInsider  -0.0013  -0.0007  -0.0011  -0.0007 
   (-2.26)  (-2.01)  (-2.14)  (-2.63) 
AQLoading  0.0006  -0.0001  0.0005  -0.0002 
  (3.67)  (-1.46)  (3.79)  (-2.25) 
InformationComponent  0.0004  -0.0001  0.0003  0.0000 
  (0.64)  (-0.25)  (0.50)  (-0.06) 
PIN  -0.0036  -0.0046  -0.0033  -0.0040 
  (-2.10)  (-3.80)  (-2.41)  (-4.13) 
R&D  0.0062  -0.0014  0.0032  -0.0022 
  (2.04)  (-0.70)  (1.46)  (-1.88) 
Volatility  0.0024  -0.0011  0.0013  -0.0021 
  (2.78)  (-1.55)  (2.00)  (-5.69) 
BeforeEarnAnnounce  0.0008  0.0009  0.0007  0.0010 
  (1.45)  (2.36)  (1.39)  (3.15) 
AfterEarnAnnounce  0.0001  -0.0002  0.0002  -0.0003 
  (0.23)  (-1.31)  (0.57)  (-1.94) 
EffectiveSpread  0.0203  0.0506  -0.0008  0.0313 
   (1.13)  (2.76)  (-0.06)  (2.82) 
MultipleInsiders  0.0013  -0.0003  0.0011  -0.0004 
  (4.33)  (-2.48)  (4.32)  (-3.46) 
ShortSide  -0.0002  -0.0009  -0.0002  -0.0008 
   (-0.59)  (-5.16)  (-0.77)  (-5.20) 
LogMarketCap  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0003  0.0000 
  (-2.18)  (-0.87)  (-3.00)  (-0.56) 
SOX  0.0052  0.0009  0.0047  0.0008 
   (4.63)  (1.65)  (4.85)  (1.66) 
Observations 147,380 86,009 325,679 221,561 147,380 86,009 325,679 221,561 
Adjusted R² 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.004 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Figure 1: Development of stealth trading over time 
Panel A: Proportion of stealth trades 
The figure displays the development of the proportion of stealth trades of all insider transactions over the sample 




Panel B: Number of transactions in a stealth trading sequence 
The figure displays the development of the average number of transactions in a stealth trading sequence over the 
sample period. The dashed vertical line marks the month when the Sarbanes-Oxley act came into force (August 
2002). 
 
